Trade Secret Protection in Japan and the United States: Comparison and Recommendations by Landman, Thomas
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 44
Issue 2 07/01/2019 Article 5
7-1-2019
Trade Secret Protection in Japan and the United
States: Comparison and Recommendations
Thomas Landman
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Intellectual
Property Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons,
Legislation Commons, Other Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the
Transnational Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Landman, Trade Secret Protection in Japan and the United States: Comparison and Recommendations, 44 Brook. J. Int'l L. 714 ().
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol44/iss2/5
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES:
COMPARISON AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
n 2014, two multinational corporations, SanDisk, headquar-
tered in the United States, and Toshiba, headquartered in
Japan, found themselves entwined in a case of international
trade secret misappropriation.
1
More than a decade earlier, the
companies had consolidated their joint-venture manufacturing
facilities for NAND flash memories in Yokkaichi, Japan.
2
NAND
flash memories are a key component for electronic devices, such
as USB flash drives and digital cameras.
3
A Japanese SanDisk
engineer who worked at the consolidated joint-venture facility
allegedly accessed and stole ten gigabytes of data relating to
NAND flash memory technology, and after leaving the company
in 2008, turned this information over to his new employer, SK
Hynix, a South Korean-owned competitor, in exchange for the
promise of “director-level compensation and benefits.”
4
Upon
learning of this theft from an informant in 2014, SanDisk and
Toshiba both filed criminal complaints with the Tokyo Police De-
partment and initiated civil suits against SK Hynix in their re-
spective home countries.
5
Toshiba originally sought $1.08 billion
1. Kyodo,Man Arrested Over Toshiba Tech Leak to SK Hynix, JAPANTIMES
(Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/03/13/na-
tional/crime-legal/man-held-in-toshiba-tech-leak-to-hynix/#.XPK38FNKhE4.
2. See Flash Venture Between Toshiba, SanDisk to Consolidate Production
in Japan, EE TIMES (Dec. 18, 2001), https://www.eetimes.com/docu-
ment.asp?doc_id=1182734.
3. Russell Kay, Flash Memory, COMPUTER WORLD (June 7, 2010),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2550624/data-center/flash-
memory.html.
4. SanDisk Corp. v. SK Hynix Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1024²26 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
5. Id. at 1025²26; Peter Clarke, Engineer Arrested as Hynix Sued Over
NAND Secrets, ELECTRONICS 360 (Mar. 14, 2014), http://electronics360.global-
spec.com/article/4097/engineer-arrested-as-hynix-sued-over-nand-secrets.
I
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USD in damages, but ultimately settled with SK Hynix in De-
cember 2014 for $278 million USD.
6
In July 2015, SanDisk also
reached a settlement in which Hynix agreed to pay licensing and
royalty fees of an undisclosed amount to SanDisk and to supply
SanDisk with certain products through 2023.
7
The former em-
ployee who had allegedly stolen the trade secrets was convicted
under Japan’s Unfair Competition Prevention Act (UCPA), and
his conviction and sentence of a five-year prison term and a three
million yen fine were affirmed on appeal by the Tokyo High
Court.
8
The Japanese media characterized this trade secret theft as
being just the “tip of the iceberg,”
9
implying an underlying sus-
picion that trade secret theft is rampant and often undetected in
Japan. Because of the high value of damages involved, this case
attracted much attention in Japan and is often cited as a prom-
inent example that helped alert Japan to the need for stronger
trade secret laws.
10
This case also marked the first time that a
Japanese court imposed (without staying execution of) the crim-
inal penalty of penal servitude for trade secret misappropria-
tion.
11
The United States has also experienced numerous high-profile
cases of trade secret misappropriation resulting in large damage
6. SK Hynix Reaches Settlement with Toshiba over Lawsuit, KOREA TIMES
(Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.ko-
reatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2017/10/133_170265.html.
7. SanDisk and SK Hynix Announce Expanded IP and Commercial Rela-
tionship; Settle Outstanding Trade Secret Litigation, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150804005672/en/SanDisk-SK-
Hynix-Announce-Expanded-IP-Commercial.
8. Kyodo, Deeta Rżei, Nishin mo Jikkeihanketsu Tżshiba Teikeisaki no
Moto Gijutsusha [Prison Sentence Affirmed by Court of Second Instance for
Data Leak by Engineer Formerly at Toshiba Business Partner], NIHON KEIZAI
SHINBUN (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.nikkei.com/arti-
cle/DGXLASDG04H5P_U5A900C1000000/.
9. E.g., Tżshiba, Ikari no Sosyż, Kankoku Kigyż ni Dankotaru Sochi 1000
Okuen Ijyż no Rieki Sżshitsu [Toshiba’s Lawsuit Sparked by Anger, Decisive
Action Against South Korean Company, Lost Profits Exceed 100 Billion Yen],
ZAKZAK (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.zakzak.co.jp/society/domes-
tic/news/20140314/dms1403141533005-n1.htm.
10. E.g., Yasuhiro Sato & Hajime Watanabe, Trade Secret Law Guidelines
Revised, IAM (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.iam-media.com/trade-secret-law-
guidelines-revised.
11. Id.
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awards.
12
The net result is a heightened awareness in industry
and in government that robust trade secret protection is
needed.
13
Indeed, at the signing of the new Defend Trade Secrets
Act of 2016 (DTSA),
14
the U.S. Department of Commerce
acknowledged that:
Failure to protect trade secrets stifles innovation and impedes
economic growth . . . trade secret theft costs U.S. innovators
more than an estimated $300 billion annually. Increasingly the
result of cyber espionage, this theft may be the largest wealth
transfer in history. Plain and simple, American innovators
need strong tools to protect their ¶secret sauce’ from getting into
the wrong hands.
15
With regard to trade secret policy, Japan and the United
States share many similar objectives, but due to cultural and le-
gal differences, they employ somewhat different means to
achieve the common goal of robust protection of trade secrets. As
12. Trade secret verdicts by U.S. courts have ranged up to $947 million
USD. See, e.g., Rob Shwarts & Cam Phan, Update: Money, Money, Money: Top
10 Trade Secret Verdicts (With Our Runner-Up Overturned), ORRICK (Apr. 7,
2014), https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2014/04/07/update-money-
money-money-top-10-trade-secret-verdicts-with-our-runner-up-overturned/;
Abhirup Roy, U.S. Jury Cuts Damages in TCS-Epic Trade Secrets Lawsuit,
REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-uk-tcs-epic-law-
suit/u-s-jury-cuts-damages-in-tcs-epic-trade-secrets-lawsuit-
idUSKCN1C71D6.
13. See generally Dan Kim, Katherine Linton & Mitchell Semanik, U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission’s Trade Secrets Roundtable: Discussion Sum-
mary, J. INT’L COM. & ECON. (Nov. 2016), available at
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/linton_semanik_trade_se-
crets_summary_0.pdf.
14. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 [DTSA], Pub. L. No. 114²153, 130 Stat.
376 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also
Dennis Crouch’s useful marked-up version of the full text of the Economic Es-
pionage Act with Defend Trade Secret Act of 2016 amendments. Dennis
Crouch, The Economic Espionage Act as Amended by the Defend Trade Secrets
Act of 2016: Markup and Commentary, PATENTLY-O (2016), https://patent-
lyo.com/media/2016/05/DTSA-Mark-UP-CROUCH-2.0.pdf.
15. Protecting America’s Secret Sauce: Trade Secret Protection for American
Innovators,
U.S. DEPT. COM. (May 13, 2016), https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170704110644/https://www.com-
merce.gov/news/blog/2016/05/protecting-americas-secret-sauce-trade-secret-
protection-american-innovators.
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global economic powers,
16
both Japan and the United States re-
alize that effective trade secret protection is vital for their do-
mestic economies, and both nations have enacted laws to protect
their trade secrets.
17
As its intellectual property (IP) assets have
become more valuable, Japan seems to have overcome its earlier
hesitations for stronger trade secret protections,
18
and has em-
barked on a series of amendments to its UCPA.
19
Meanwhile, the
United States has strengthened its Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA)
20
and has recently enacted a federal law, the DTSA.
21
Both nations are leaders in IP-intensive fields, such as pharma-
ceuticals, electronics, and automobiles, which are founded upon
ideas and knowledge that are costly and time-consuming to ac-
crue, and both seek to reap the rewards of this knowledge
16. The World Bank’s 2017 ranking of national Gross Domestic Products
lists the United States and Japan as the first and third largest, respectively.
(Note that this ranking system does not include the multinational European
Union, which if included, would be ranked second.). GDP (Current US$),
WORLD BANK GROUP, https://data.worldbank.org/indica-
tor/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?year_high_desc=true (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
17. Japan has enacted, and continues to amend, its UCPA while the United
States has the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which is adopted by most
states, and the DTSA, which is a federal law. See infra notes 19²21.
18. Mitsuo Matsushita, Panel Three: A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual
Property Rights and the GATT, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 87 (1992) (explaining
how earlier Japanese policy for protecting IP rights, including trade secrets,
was reluctant to pursue strong enforcement measures out of concern for pro-
tecting Japan’s domestic manufacturing industries, especially against the
threat of antidumping accusations and sanctions from the United States).
19. Fusei Kyżsż Bżshi Hż [Japan’s Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Act
No. 47 of 1993, as amended up to Act No. 54 of 2015 (Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry), http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/chi-
zai/chiteki/pdf/joubunkaiseitokekomashi_201608unfaircompetition.pdf, trans-
lated in Unfair Competition Prevention Act (Act No. 47 of 1993), WORLDTRADE
ORG., https://members.wto.org/crnattach-
ments/2016/IP/JPN/16_0307_00_e.pdf (last visited May 22, 2019) [hereinafter
UCPA].
20. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT [UTSA] §§ 1²12, 14 U.L.A. 529²659 (2005),
available at https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download-
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=e19b2528-e0b1-0054-23c4-
8069701a4b62&forceDialog=0. The UTSA has been adopted by forty-eight of
the fifty states. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
21. DTSA, Pub. L. No. 114²153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
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through licensing their technology and in doing so depend on ef-
fective protection mechanisms.
22
Dissimilarities among Japanese and U.S. trade secret policy
arise largely from cultural and systemic differences between the
two nations. In broad generalizations, Japan can be viewed as
having a highly homogeneous society that values group loyalty
and reputation, while the United States consists of a diverse cit-
izenry that embraces individualism.
23
Japanese society, how-
ever, is changing and the effects of corporate restructuring, a
worker shortage, and an increasing percentage of part-time
workers have upended the traditional Japanese system of life-
time employment, resulting in a workforce that is more mobile
and that considers changing employers over the course of one’s
career as an inevitability.
24
Other differences between the two
countries are attributable to their different legal systems: Japan
22. See generally Top 10: Car Producing Countries, Worldwide and EU,
EUR. AUTO. MFRS. ASSOC. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.acea.be/statistics/arti-
cle/top-10-car-producing-countries-worldwide-and-eu; DEPT. OF COM., INT’L
TRADE ADMIN., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT: SEMICONDUCTORS AND
SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT (2016), available at
https://www.trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Semiconductors_Executive_Sum-
mary.pdf; Eamonn Fingleton, It Is Japan, Not The U.S., That Leads In Serious
Technology, Says Top Reagan Technology Advisor, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/eamonnfingleton/2015/11/22/it-is-japan-not-the-
u-s-that-leads-in-serious-technology-says-top-reagan-technology-advi-
sor/#4d3177844023.
23. See, e.g., Chris Burgess, Maintaining Identities, Discourses in Homoge-
neity in a Rapidly Globalizing Japan, ELECTRONIC J.CONTEMP. JAPANESESTUD.
(May 29, 2012), https://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Bur-
gess.html#_edn1; Gary R. Weaver, American Cultural Values, KOKUSAIBUNKA
KENSHU [INTERCULTURAL TRAINING] SPECIAL EDITION 9, 9²15 (1999), available
at http://trends.gmfus.org/doc/mmf/American%20Cultural%20Values.pdf; Jay
Dratler Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A Comparison and
Prognosis, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 110²12 (1989), available at http://digitalcom-
mons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol14/iss1/3 (attributing the sociocultural factors for Ja-
pan’s seemingly sluggish attention to the need for trade secret protection to
“extreme individual loyalty to the group,” a general “disapprov[al] of employee
mobility” (and preference for company loyalty), and “the notion of ¶face,’ or per-
sonal reputation”).
24. See, e.g., Job-Changing Reaches a Seven-Year High as Japan, Inc.
Scrambles to Cope with Labor Shortages, JAPAN TIMES (July 5, 2017),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/05/business/job-changing-reaches-
seven-year-high-japan-inc-scrambles-cope-labor-shortages/#.Wlz_k7bMyqB.
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is a civil law country, while the United States follows the com-
mon law tradition.
25
Typically, a civil law country will update its
laws with frequent, detailed amendments, while a common law
country would require fewer, less detailed statutory amend-
ments since its courts can create new law under the doctrine of
stare decisis.
26
Specific provisions in the written constitutions of
the two countries also ensure that different approaches are
taken so as not to impinge on the respective rights and liberties
of their citizens.
27
Another subtle difference is that the United States considers
trade secrets to be a form of IP,
28
while civil law countries, such
as Japan, consider trade secret protection as a form of unfair
competition law.
29
The different approaches reflect a long-stand-
ing debate over whether trade secrets are a form of property that
inheres a right to exclude others from their use or whether trade
25. See Piyali Syam, Major Differences Between the Japanese and United
States Legal Systems, WASH. U. SCH. L. (Nov. 20, 2013), https://online-
law.wustl.edu/blog/major-differences-between-the-japanese-and-american-le-
gal-systems/ (noting that while the civil-law/common-law distinction exists be-
tween Japan and the U.S., this distinction is not absolute because courts in the
U.S. do consider codified (legislated) law and courts in Japan do consider non-
binding case law precedents).
26. Stare decisis is a doctrine of precedent that generally binds courts to
follow previous judicial decisions on issues that have been previously litigated.
See, e.g., Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
27. The Constitution of Japan specifies that “[e]very person shall have free-
dom to . . . choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with
the public welfare” (art. 22, para. 1) (guaranteeing employee mobility) and that
“[t]rials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly” (art. 82, para. 1)
(guaranteeing judicial transparency). NIHONKOKU KENPŻ [KENPŻ]
[CONSTITUTION], art. 22, para. 1, art. 82, para. 1 (Japan), translated in The
Constitution of Japan, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN & HIS CABINET, http://ja-
pan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
(last visited May 22, 2019).
Within trade secret law, there is constant tension between an employer’s need
for preventing former employees from using or disseminating trade secrets in
the course of subsequent employment and a worker’s need for employment mo-
bility. Moreover, the requirement of judicial transparency conflicts with the
need for secrecy during trade secret-related litigation to prevent unintended
disclosure.
28. In the United States, trade secrets are frequently grouped together with
patents, copyrights and trademarks as the four types of IP. See Trade Secret
Policy, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-
protection/trade-secrets-policy.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
29. Japan does not have an explicit trade secret law, but rather includes
trade secret protection within its UCPA. See UCPA, supra note 19.
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secret misappropriation is to be prohibited as a wrongful act of
unfair competition.
30
Although both Japan and the United States already have
strong laws in place to protect their trade secrets,
31
global trends
of the digital age will likely drive both nations to strengthen
their laws further as the risks of industrial espionage and mis-
appropriation of trade secrets increase.
32
Other trends that will
inevitably increase the risk of trade secret misappropriation in-
clude greater employee mobility, increasingly interconnected
and networked business environments, frequent contact with
overseas clients, greater outsourcing of work, and increasingly
severe global competition among businesses.
33
It must be mentioned that the European Union (EU) is also an
active participant in this arena and has recently adopted a Trade
Secrets Directive that aims to harmonize trade secret law
throughout the EU member states.
34
Numerous English-lan-
guage studies and reports comparing U.S. trade secret law with
this EU Trade Secrets Directive already exist, but few compare
that U.S. law with Japan’s latest amended trade secret law. It is
the author’s hope that this Note provides further insight into the
workings of Japanese trade secret law and further supplements
this body of knowledge.
From the above perspectives, this Note explores Japan and the
United States’ approach toward their common goal of providing
30. See generally Dratler, supra note 23, at 104²07.
31. The OECD, in its 2010 Trade Secrets Protection Index, ranked the U.S
first worldwide with Japan being a close runner-up. See OECD, Enquires Into
Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact: Chapter 3. Approaches to the Protec-
tion of Trade Secrets, 25²26, OECD Doc. DSTI/ICCP(2014)17/CHAP3/FINAL
(July 29, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocu-
mentpdf/?cote=DSTI/ICCP(2014)17/CHAP3/FINAL&docLanguage=En [here-
inafter 2010 Trade Secrets Protection Index].
32. E.g., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATION
STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS (2013), available
at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/938321/download.
33. FAQ: Protection Against the Unlawful Acquisition of Undisclosed Know-
How and Business Information (Trade Secrets): Why is There a Need to Har-
monise National Laws in This Area?, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/trade-secrets/faq_en (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2019).
34. Directive 2016/943, of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Se-
crets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L
157/1) [hereinafter EU Trade Secrets Directive].
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effective trade secret protection, highlighting their similarities
and differences, and also suggesting areas in which each country
could further strengthen and harmonize their trade secret laws.
Below, Part I discusses the characteristics of trade secrets and
the requirements mandated by the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
35
which sets the
minimum standards of trade secret protection for Japan, the
United States and all other member nations of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
36
Part II examines the history of trade se-
cret laws in Japan, focusing on the evolution of the UCPA,
37
and
in the United States, namely the UTSA
38
and the DTSA.
39
Then,
Part III compares how Japanese and U.S. trade secret laws con-
form with the TRIPS Agreement requirements of protectable
subject matter, the specific types of acts of trade secret misap-
propriation that are prohibited by each country’s laws, and the
types of relief available. Next, Part IV discusses policy concerns
regarding the need for multilateral trade secret agreements in
this interconnected digital age and the risk of overreaching trade
secret laws that could unreasonably restrain personal freedoms.
Finally, Part V offers recommendations on how each country’s
laws could be improved and harmonized further. For Japan, the
recommendations are to expand applicability of their new bur-
den-shifting provision, which is a measure to partially compen-
sate for the lack of pre-trial discovery by compelling, in certain
situations, an alleged infringer to demonstrate an absence of
trade secret misappropriation, to improve secrecy during litiga-
tion, to improve robustness of relief provisions by expediting the
35. The TRIPS Agreement is a comprehensive international agreement on
the protection of IP and covers, inter alia, copyright, trademarks, patents and
undisclosed information (trade secrets). See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement,
WORLDTRADEORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
36. The WTO is an international organization that regulates trading be-
tween nations with the aim of facilitating the smooth flow of free trade. See
What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
37. See UCPA, supra note 19.
38. See UTSA §§ 1²12, 14 U.L.A. 529²659 (2005). The UTSA aims to codify
“the basic principles of common law trade secret protection.” Id. Prefatory
Note, 14 U.L.A. 530²31.
39. The DTSA amends the earlier Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104²294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831²1839 (2012)) to cre-
ate a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. See DTSA,
Pub. L. No. 114²153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
722 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
processing of requests for injunctions and allowing ex parte in-
junctions, and to allow awards for punitive damages and attor-
ney’s fees. For the United States, the recommendations are to
continue to pursue multilateral trade secret agreements to ex-
pand the scope of trade secret protection and to be more proac-
tive in providing guidance for keeping trade secrets safe. Alt-
hough Japan and the United States have well-developed trade
secret laws, these recommendations will further a mutually ben-
eficial system of robust global trade secret protection.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE SECRETS AND THE TRIPS
REQUIREMENTS
Contrary to what might be casually presumed about trade se-
cret law, the existence of trade secret law³in keeping valuable
knowledge secret and thereby allowing its owners to reap the
rewards of such knowledge³actually fosters innovation, invest-
ment and the dissemination of knowledge.
40
Indeed, the notion
that trade secret protection fosters innovation was affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court in its landmark ruling in
Kewanee v. Bicron.
41
Unlike a patent, which is a government grant of a term-limited
monopoly in exchange for the disclosure of knowledge for the
benefit of the public, a trade secret can be secretly maintained
in perpetuity.
42
A trade secret, however, is fragile and its value
40. Affirming this concept, James Pooley, former general director of the
World Intellectual Property Organization, writes that “[a]lthough it may seem
paradoxical, trade secret laws can enable and encourage technology transfer,
because they provide a commercially reasonable way to disseminate infor-
mation.” James Pooley, Trade Secrets: The Other IP Right, WIPOMAG. (June
2013), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/03/article_0001.html.
41. In holding that federal patent law did not preempt Ohio’s state trade
secret law, the Supreme Court opined that “[t]rade secret law will encourage
invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the inde-
pendent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his inven-
tion.” The preclusion of trade secret protection would result in “hoard[ing] ra-
ther than [the] disseminat[ion of] knowledge . . . and a “detrimental misalloca-
tion of resources and economic waste.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 485²87 (1974).
42. In both Japan and the United States, patents are granted for a term of
twenty years. See FAQs: Patent, 6-15 Can I Have Information on Duration of
Right and Time Limit for Payment of Patent/Registration Fee?, JAPAN PAT.
OFF. (JPO), https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/faq/yokuaru/patent.html#anchor6-15 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2019); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013) (Contents and Term of Patent;
Provisional Rights).
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as a competitive advantage will be lost if publicly disclosed.
Trade secret protection is also non-exclusive, which means that
independent creation and reverse engineering are allowed.
43
An-
other difference between a trade secret and other forms of IP is
that trade secret infringement necessarily involves morality³
that is, the commission of a wrongful act.
44
Despite the comparatively weaker protection afforded trade
secrets, companies often seek to maintain their knowledge as
trade secrets.
45
Advantages of trade secrets include unlimited
duration, lower cost than other forms of IP protection (although
the cost of reasonable measures to maintain secrecy must be con-
sidered), and applicability to a broad range of subject matter.
46
Disadvantages of trade secret protection include the absence of
guaranteed exclusivity, a need for constant vigilance to ensure
secrecy, and the market risk (including a possible drop in com-
pany stock price) that may result in acknowledging trade secret
misappropriation.
47
As the nations of the world become more interconnected and
as IP accounts for increasingly higher percentages of national
43. Off. of Pol’y & External Aff., Trade Secret Protection in the U.S., USPTO
16, https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/mep/marinaslides.pdf
(last visited May 22, 2019).
44. Trade secret laws impose liability in cases where the infringing party
knows, or should have known, that the trade secret was obtained through im-
proper means. This is in contrast to patent law, which does not grant an excep-
tion for unintentional infringement. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS Agreement] art. 39, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994); UTSA § 1(2)(i), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005)
(generally defining trade secret misappropriation as the acquisition of a trade
secret by a person who “knows or has reason to know” the acquisition is im-
proper or who “used improper means” to acquire the trade secret); UCPA, su-
pra note 19, art. 2(1) (defining unfair competition as “acquiring [a trade secret]
with the knowledge, or gross negligence in not knowing” of the improper act or
disclosure).
45. Katherine Linton, The Importance of Trade Secrets: New Directions in
International Trade Policy Making and Empirical Research, J. INT’L COM. &
ECON. 1, 6²8 (2016), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2893319 (reporting
that more U.S. firms identify trade secrets as being “¶very important’ to their
operations than other types of IP”).
46. See, e.g., Pooley, supra note 40; Kim et al., supra note 13, at 1, 3²4.
47. See, e.g., Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies
by the Stock Market Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espi-
onage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25, 52 (2001); Kim et al., supra note 13, at 1, 5.
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economies,
48
the protection of IP becomes increasingly im-
portant. The annual cost of trade secret theft to the United
States and other advanced industrial nations is estimated to
range from 1 percent to 3 percent of each country’s gross domes-
tic product (GDP).
49
In light of such concerns, and to standardize the protection of
IP throughout the world, the member nations of the WTO have
negotiated the TRIPS Agreement.
50
During those negotiations,
the U.S. delegation lobbied vigorously for the inclusion of trade
secrets among the intellectual property rights (IPRs) to be cov-
ered by the TRIPS Agreement and ultimately prevailed over op-
position from developing countries who feared that such IPRs
might hamper free trade.
51
This marked the first time that trade
secret protection was expressly embraced by “a major and wide-
spread international treaty.”
52
The TRIPS Agreement sets a
baseline of minimum standards for the protection of IP by WTO
member nations, including Japan and the United States, but
48. See, e.g., JUSTIN ANTONIPILLAI ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
U.S. ECONOMY: 2016 UPDATE 22 (2016), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEcono-
mySept2016.pdf (reporting that between 2010 and 2014, IP-intensive indus-
tries’ contribution to the U.S. economy increased from $5.06 trillion USD to
$6.6 trillion USD, corresponding to a percentage increase in the share of total
U.S. Gross Domestic Product from 34.8 to 38.2 percent); Connor Cislo, Brain
Power Pays Off With Japan’s Intellectual Property Exports, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-15/brain-power-
pays-off-with-japan-s-intellectual-property-exports.
49. PAMELA PASSMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT: A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANIES TO SAFEGUARD TRADE SECRETS AND MITIGATE
POTENTIAL THREATS 3 (2014), available at https://create.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/07/CREATe.org-PwC-Trade-Secret-Theft-FINAL-Feb-2014_01.pdf.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines GDP as the “total market value of the
goods and services produced by a country’s economy during a specified period
of time.” Peter Bondarenko, Gross Domestic Product, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic/gross-domestic-
product.
50. The TRIPS Agreement came into effect in on January 1, 1995 after final
negotiations during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35.
51. ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, TRADE SECRECY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 26 (2015) [hereinafter ROWE&SANDEEN, TRADE
SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS]; ELIZABETHA. ROWE&SHARONK.
SANDEEN, TRADE SECRET LAW CASES ANDMATERIALS 532 (2d ed. 2017) [herein-
after ROWE&SANDEEN, TRADE SECRET LAWCASES ANDMATERIALS].
52. Id.
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each member nation is free to establish broader levels of protec-
tion.
53
Article 39(2) of the TRIPS Agreement concerns trade secrets,
and expressly protects information that (1) “is secret;” (2) “has
commercial value because it is secret;” and (3) “has been subject
to reasonable steps under the circumstances . . . to keep it se-
cret.”
54
The TRIPS Agreement requires member states to give
persons lawfully in control of such information the ability to pre-
vent the unauthorized disclosure, acquisition or use by others
“in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.”
55
53. Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35.
54. Article 39(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that:
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of pre-
venting information lawfully within their control from being
disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their con-
sent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices
(n.10) so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the
precise configuration and assembly of its components, gener-
ally known among or readily accessible to persons within the
circles that normally deal with the kind of information in
question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circum-
stances, by the person lawfully in control of the information,
to keep it secret.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 39(2).
Footnote 10 of Article 39(2) provides that:
For the purpose of this provision, ¶a manner contrary to hon-
est commercial practices’ shall mean at least practices such
as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to
breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed infor-
mation by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent
in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the
acquisition.
Id. art. 39(2) n.10.
55. Id. art. 39(2); also see Id. art. 39(2) n.10. (further indicating that “in a
manner contrary to honest commercial practices” includes breach of contract,
breach of confidence and inducement to breach, as well as the acquisition of
undisclosed information by “third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent
in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition”).
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Another notable aspect of the TRIPS Agreement is its enforce-
ment of fair and equitable procedures.
56
Article 42 provides that
member nations must provide “civil judicial procedures” for en-
forcing IPRs covered by the Agreement, and that confidential in-
formation be protected from disclosure during litigation unless
doing so would be contrary to the country’s constitutional re-
quirements.
57
II. HISTORY OF TRADE SECRET LAWS IN JAPAN AND THEUNITED
STATES
This Part will discuss the evolution of trade secret laws in Ja-
pan and the United States. In contrast to the United States’ con-
sistent leadership in trade secret protection, Japan has been
somewhat of a latecomer to enacting strong trade secret protec-
tions. Nevertheless, both countries today have strong trade se-
cret protections in place.
58
A. History of Trade Secret Protection in Japan (the UCPA)
Japanese trade secrets were traditionally protected by civil
codes based on tort law, contract law, commercial codes that pro-
vided for injunctions or damages against contract violations, and
penal codes in cases of theft or embezzlement.
59
Contract law is
applicable when privity exists between the party who misappro-
priated the trade secret and the trade secret owner. In trade se-
cret misappropriation cases, however, contract law is often inap-
plicable because there is frequently no privity between the party
from whom the trade secret originated and the party who is us-
ing the trade secret illicitly. On the other hand, Japanese tort
law, specifically Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code, provides
for the remedy of damages against improper acts by third par-
ties, but lacks any express provision for injunctions.
60
56. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, pt. III (Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights).
57. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 42 (Fair and Equitable Proce-
dures).
58. 2010 Trade Secrets Protection Index, supra note 31.
59. KAZUOUBUKATA ET AL., QUESTION Q215: PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
THROUGH IPR AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AIPPI 1²2 (2010), available at
https://aippi.org/download/commitees/215/GR215japan.pdf.
60. MINPŻ [MINPŻ] [CIV. C.] art. 709 (Japan), available at
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000056024.pdf. Article 709 of the Japanese Civil
Code stipulates that “A person who has intentionally or negligently infringed
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In 1934, Japan enacted its UCPA to demonstrate its readiness
to be recognized as a developed county and also to comply with
provisions relating to unfair competition contained in the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.
61
The Jap-
anese government rushed to enact this law out of an eagerness
to be recognized as a developed country.
62
Consequently, the
original version had many gaps.
63
For example, although the law
dealt with unfair competition, there was no specific provision
concerning the protection of trade secrets.
64
The incomplete form
of this act may explain the sparseness of trade secret litigation
in Japan over the first fifty years of the UCPA’s existence.
65
In the following years, Japan amended the UCPA several
times, with the next major amendment coming in 1950. The
1950 amendment to the UCPA added a provision prohibiting
misleading representations of goods.
66
Then, in 1990, the UCPA
was amended to include the express protection of trade secrets.
That amendment was driven by pressure from GATT
67
member
countries for Japan to harmonize its laws with those of other
any right of others, or legally protected interest of others, shall be liable to
compensate any damages resulting in consequence.” Id.
61. See Paris Convention of the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 307; Junichi Eguchi, History of Amend-
ments to the Unfair Competition Prevention Act of Japan: From a Developing
Country to a Developed Country, 41 OSAKAU. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994).
62. Eguchi, supra note 61.
63. Id.
64. Tatsubumi Sato, Intellectual Property High Court Judge, Protection of
Trade Secret in Japan, Presentation at the International Conference on Com-
parative Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Chongqing,
China 1 (Sept. 28²29, 2006), in Judge of IP High Court Participates in Inter-
national Conference in PRC, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT.,
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/060928_01.pdf (last visited May 22,
2019).
65. Eguchi, supra note 61. But see Katsuya Tamai, Sangyż Supai Dai-
sakusenaBujinesu no Saizennsen de no Hżritsu no Ohanashia [Industrial Es-
pionage Strategy: Legal Topics at the Frontlines of Business], 67 SEISAN
KENKYU 405, 412 (2015), available at http://doi.org/10.11188/seisanken-
kyu.67.405 (arguing that the paucity of serious trade secret cases in Japan, as
compared to the United States, is the result of trade secret misappropriation
having been undetected by a poorly functioning legal system).
66. Eguchi, supra note 61, at 2.
67. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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countries,
68
as well as by societal demands arising from an in-
creasingly mobile workforce and from the business sector.
69
The
1990 UCPA contained provisions for the protection of trade se-
crets under Japanese civil law,
70
but did not include any provi-
sions for criminal remedies.
71
Another notable feature of the
1990 amendment was that, for the first time, it provided amech-
anism for injunctive relief against third parties who lacked priv-
ity with the trade secret owner.
72
To avoid being overly protec-
tive of trade secrets and to avoid creating a system that could
easily be abused, however, the new amendment imposed a strict
statute of limitations after which the right to injunctive relief, if
not exercised, would extinguish.
73
Later, in the early 2000s, fur-
ther amendments were made to the UCPA, notably adding crim-
inal remedies for the infringement and misappropriation of
trade secrets and providing mechanisms for closed civil trials to
maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets.
74
In July 2015, Japanese lawmakers passed the latest series of
amendments to the UCPA. This new law went into effect on Jan-
uary 1, 2016 and has three main aims: (1) to expand the scope of
protection subject to criminal penalties; (2) to strengthen deter-
rents to trade secret infringement; and (3) to increase the effec-
tiveness of civil remedies.
75
New features of the UCPA include:
penalties for attempted infringement
76
and not only completed
acts of infringement; a lower burden of proof for technical trade
secret information used in manufacturing;
77
an extended statute
68. Eguchi, supra note 61.
69. Sato, supra note 64.
70. Sato, supra note 64.
71. UBUKATA, supra note 59, at 2.
72. Kazuko Matsuo, Recent Amendment to the Unfair Competition Preven-
tion Law for the Protection of Trade Secrets, 9 UCLAPAC. BASINL.J. 78 (1991).
73. Id. at 92 (describing that the right to injunctive relief provided in Article
3 bis of the 1990 UCPA would extinguish if not exercised within three years of
the trade secret owner becoming aware of the trade secret misappropriation,
or after ten years if the use of the trade secret had been undetected).
74. Sato, supra note 64.
75. Zensho Imari, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Presentation
on Trade Secret Protection in Japan 5 (Oct. 6, 2015), available at
http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/default/files/presentations/docs/mr.-imari.pdf.
76. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 21(4).
77. Id. art. 5(2) (The statute imposes a rebuttable presumption that the de-
fendant has used the plaintiff’s technical trade secret related to a manufactur-
ing method. This rebuttable presumption is a burden-shifting provision that
requires the defendant to demonstrate that its manufacturing method does not
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of limitations;
78
expanded criminal sanctions;
79
and stronger de-
terrents in the form of larger criminal fines.
80
B. History of Trade Secret Protection in the United States
The two main trade secret laws in the United States are the
UTSA, which has been adopted and ratified by the majority of
states, and the DTSA, which is a new federal law designed to
provide a federal civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation
without preempting existing state trade secret law.
81
This sec-
tion will discuss the evolution of these laws.
Prior to the accumulation of a significant body of case law or
the enactment of statutes specifically targeting trade secret mis-
appropriation, early trade secret cases in the United States were
adjudicated on the basis of tort law, contract law, principles of
equity, and the like.
82
The first recorded trade secret case in the
United States was the 1837 decision in Vickery v. Welch.
83
In this
early case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts looked
to English case law based on principles of equity and ruled that
the defendant, after promising to sell his chocolate mills and se-
cret art for making chocolate exclusively to the plaintiff, could
use the plaintiff’s trade secret.); see MICHIRU TAKAHASHI ET. AL, JAPAN
STRENGTHENSDETERRENCEMEASURES AGAINST TRADE SECRET INFRINGEMENT 3
(2016), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/2b509a75-1a2e-
4a7d-8b32-6c82a6edeb8d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b7bb32d1-
b712-4021-b090-7c98eceee9b4/Japan_Strengthens_Deterrence_Measures.pdf.
78. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 15 (lengthening the statute of limitations to
three years from the time when the person learns of the infringement and the
identity of the infringer, and to twenty years from the time when the infringe-
ment began).
79. Id. art. 21 (expanding the extraterritorial reach by specifying that the
wrongful acquisition of a trade secret³not only the wrongful use or disclosure
as previously proscribed³outside Japan can lead to criminal sanctions pursu-
ant to Article 21(6)). See Christoph Rademacher, Recent Legislation in Japan
No.4 “Intellectual Property / Trade Secret Protection: Unfair Competition Pre-
vention Act”, WASEDA U. INST. COMP. L. (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.waseda.jp/folaw/icl/news-en/2017/02/21/5680/.
80. See UCPA, supra note 19, art. 21(1).
81. See UTSA §§ 1²12, 14 U.L.A. 529²659 (2005); DTSA, Pub. L. No. 114²
153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
82. SHARON K. SANDEEN & ELIZABETH A. ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 1²2 (2d ed. 2018) [hereinafter SANDEEN&ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW
IN ANUTSHELL].
83. DONALDS. CHISUM ET. AL, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAW
204 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837)).
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not retain the right to tell the secret to others.
84
Throughout the
nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, a growing
body of common law became the primary authority for United
States trade secret law.
85
As part of an initiative to make state
laws more uniform, in 1939, the American Law Institute pub-
lished the Restatement (First) of Torts, which included three
sections that concerned trade secrecy.
86
With the goal of provid-
ing a uniform framework for trade secret jurisprudence, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws pub-
lished the UTSA in 1979.
87
In contrast to a Restatement, the
UTSA, once adopted by a state, becomes a primary authority,
while a Restatement will remain a secondary authority.
88
This
distinction is significant because a state’s adopted version of the
UTSA will be binding on its courts, whereas a secondary author-
ity will only have persuasive effect.
The prefatory note to the UTSA declares that its intended con-
tribution is to standardize definitions of “trade secret” and
“trade secret misappropriation,” and to prescribe a single statute
of limitations.
89
This prefatory note also hints at another reason
for the need to have strong trade secret laws by pointing out a
disadvantage of the patent law system:
A valid patent provides a legal monopoly for seventeen years
in exchange for public disclosure of an invention. If, however,
the courts ultimately decide that the Patent Office improperly
issued a patent, an invention will have been disclosed to com-
petitors with no corresponding benefit.
90
In other words, by maintaining an invention as a trade secret,
and not disclosing it to the public, the trade secret owner may
enjoy greater certainty over the benefit derived from the trade
secret.
84. Vickery, 36 Mass. at 527.
85. CHISUM, supra note 83, at 206.
86. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757, 758, 759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939);
SANDEEN&ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW IN ANUTSHELL, supra note 82, at 3.
87. CHISUM, supra note 83, at 207²08.
88. SANDEEN & ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 82, at
30.
89. UTSA, Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 530²31 (2005).
90. Id.
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The UTSA, to date, has been adopted by forty-eight of the fifty
states
91
and has become the “primary source of trade secret law
in the United States.”
92
Although New York and North Carolina
have yet to adopt the UTSA, through common law and state stat-
utes, those states have substantially harmonized their trade se-
cret law with the general principles espoused in the UTSA.
93
Complementing UTSA state law, which may be limited by ju-
risdictional issues in cross-border disputes among states, the re-
cently enacted DTSA aims to strengthen trade secret protection
by providing a federal civil remedy for the misappropriation of
trade secrets.
94
The DTSA amends the Economic Espionage Act
of 1996 (EEA),
95
a federal criminal statute, to include a private
civil cause of action and contains provisions for injunctions, dam-
age awards, and in extraordinary circumstances requiring expe-
dited relief, the ex parte seizure of property.
96
III. COMPARISON OF TRADE SECRET STATUTES IN JAPAN AND
THEUNITED STATES
Below, this Note compares Japanese and U.S. trade secret law
in several ways. First, it compares the subject matter definitions
of protectable trade secrets in Japan’s UCPA and the United
States’ UTSA/DTSA to the requirements of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Second, it compares the specific acts of trade secret mis-
appropriation that are prohibited. Third, it surveys the types of
relief available.
91. As of Spring 2019, the only states to have not formally adopted some
version of the UTSA are New York and North Carolina. The latest addition is
Massachusetts, which adopted the UTSA in 2018. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF.
L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Com-
munityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited Mar. 30,
2019).
92. ROWE&SANDEEN, TRADE SECRET LAWCASES ANDMATERIALS, supra note
51, at 31.
93. ROWE & SANDEEN, TRADE SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 51, at 35.
94. S. REP. NO. 114²220, at 3 (2016), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-114srpt220/pdf/CRPT-114srpt220.pdf.
95. EEA, Pub. L. No. 104²294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831²
1839 (2012)).
96. S. REP. NO. 114²220, supra note 94.
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A. Comparison of Protectable Trade Secret Subject Matter
Below, various definitions of trade secret subject matter as ex-
pressed in Japan’s UCPA and the United States’ UTSA/DTSA
are compared through the lens of requirements prescribed in Ar-
ticle 39(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.
97
The TRIPS Agreement
sets a minimum standard that each WTO member nation is ob-
ligated to satisfy.
Article 2(6) of Japan’s UCPA defines a trade secret as “tech-
nical or business information useful for business activities, such
as manufacturing or marketing methods, that is kept secret and
that is not publicly known.”
98
Based on this definition, a trade
secret must be “technical or business information” and must sat-
isfy three requirements: that it is (1) “useful,” (2) “kept secret,”
and (3) “not publicly known.”
99
The UCPA subject matter requirement of “technical or busi-
ness information” is regarded as a broad category, and most
types of technical or business information will satisfy this re-
quirement.
100
Examples of qualifying technical or business infor-
mation include product design and manufacturing methods, cus-
tomer and supplier lists, and sales manuals.
101
By contrast, in the United States, under the UTSA, a trade
secret is defined as information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process,
that (1) is not generally known or readily ascertainable; (2) has
independent economic value; and (3) is the subject of reasonable
efforts to maintain its secrecy.
102
97. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 39(2).
98. Quoting the unofficial English translation of article 2(6) of Japan’s
UCPA. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 2(6).
99. Id.
100. Kazuko Matsuo, Japan, in TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD §
23:2 (Melvin Jager ed., 2016).
101. UBUKATA, supra note 59, at 4; Gijutsu Ryƈshutsu Bżshi, Eigyż Himitsu
Hogo Kyżka ni Tsuite [Regarding the Prevention of Technology Outflows and
Strengthening of Trade Secret Protection], MINISTRY ECON., INDUS. & TRADE 13
(2014), http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/sankoushin/chitekizaisan/eigyo-
himitsu/pdf/001_05_00.pdf.
102. Section 1(4) of the UTSA provides the following definition of a trade se-
cret:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pat-
tern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that:
2019] Trade Secret Protection in Japan and the US 733
The DTSA, which was modeled in part after the UTSA, defines
a trade secret in a substantially similar manner.
103
The main
differences in subject matter definitions are that the DTSA pro-
vides a slightly more detailed list of the applicable forms and
types of information,
104
and as a federal statute enacted under
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, the
DTSA is only applicable to trade secrets relating to “a product or
service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign com-
merce.”
105
Because the USTA and DTSA protect similar types of
trade secret subject matter, they will be considered jointly in the
TRIPS subject matter analysis below.
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily as-
certainable by proper means by, other persons who can ob-
tain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UTSA § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
103. ROWE&SANDEEN, TRADE SECRET LAWCASES ANDMATERIALS, supra note
51, at 46²48.
104. The DTSA defines a trade secret as
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, pro-
totypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, pro-
grams, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether
or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, elec-
tronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if (A)
the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and (B) the information derives in-
dependent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
through proper means by, another person who can obtain eco-
nomic value from the disclosure or use of the information[.]
18 U.S.C. §1839(3) (2012).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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1. TRIPS Subject Matter Requirement 1: The Information “is
secret”
106
The TRIPS Agreement requires secrecy “in the sense that [the
information] is not . . . generally known among or readily acces-
sible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the
kind of information in question.”
107
The analysis below shows
that both Japanese and U.S. trade secret laws are similar in this
regard and satisfy the TRIPS secrecy prong.
a. Japan: UCPA’s “not publicly known” Requirement
The “not publicly known” requirement of Article 2(6) the
UCPA is satisfied if the information is “normally not available
outside the control of its holder,” such as if it has not been pub-
lished.
108
Even if the information is known by others, as long as
those parties maintain the information in a confidential manner,
it will still be considered to be “not publicly known.”
109
In pub-
lished guidelines for trade secret management, the Japanese
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) defines “not
publicly known” as the condition where the trade secret infor-
mation is not generally known and not readily knowable.
110
Of-
ten, the issue of reverse engineering arises when public
knowledge of a product is in dispute. In such cases, a significant
factor is the ease at which the information was acquired,
whether it was obtained through a complex and arduous reverse
engineering process or a quick and simple analysis.
111
106. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 39(2)(a).
107. Id.
108. UBUKATA, supra note 59, at 4.
109. UBUKATA, supra note 59, at 4.; Eigyż Himitsu Kanri Shishin [Trade Se-
cret Management Guidelines], MINISTRY ECON., INDUS. & TRADE 16 (2015),
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/chizai/chiteki/pdf/20150128hontai.pdf
[hereinafter Trade Secret Management Guidelines] (noting that the “not pub-
licly known” requirement of the UCPA is satisfied as long as the confidentiality
of the information is actually maintained and that this differs from the novelty
requirement of article 29 of Japanese Patent Law).
110. Trade Secret Management Guidelines, supra note 109, at 16 (noting that
this definition is similar to the requirement of Article 39, Paragraph 2(a) of the
TRIPS Agreement). This language is also in agreement with the UTSA/DTSA
requirement of “[being] not generally known . . . and not being readily ascer-
tainable.” See infra note 119.
111. Masataka Kawakami, Himitsukanrisei Handan ni okeru Hżunyż Keis-
eikatei no Kentż Oyobi Mondaiteiki [A Study and Opinion about the Formation
Process of Application of Law in a Judgment of Management of Secrecy], 2
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One such example is New Create K.K. v. K.K. GT Japan.
112
In
New Create, the plaintiff accused two former employees of copy-
ing electronic design data for a ceramic capacitor laminating ma-
chine and printer as they were leaving the company to work else-
where.
113
The defendants asserted that the alleged trade secret
was publicly known because the data could be obtained through
reverse-engineering machines that the plaintiff had been selling
publicly without an NDA.
114
The electronic data in question re-
lated to a total of approximately six thousand design draw-
ings.
115
The design drawings were very detailed, listing the
shapes, dimensions, and other information ranging from several
hundred to one thousand-plus components per machine model,
and they disclosed a high-level of manufacturing know-how for
laminating machines.
116
The court ultimately rejected the de-
fendant’s assertion and found the information to have been “not
publicly known.”
117
In reaching this decision, the court reasoned
that in consideration of the quantity, content, and circumstances
of the electronic data, it would be difficult to reverse-engineer
the same data as the plaintiff’s electronic data, and reverse-en-
gineering, if undertaken, would have required time-consuming
and expensive analysis by a highly-skilled expert.
118
b. United States: UTSA/DTSA’s “not generally known . . . and
not being readily ascertainable” Requirement
Comments to Section 1 of the UTSA emphasize that the condi-
tion of “not being generally known . . . and not being readily as-
certainable” refers not to the awareness of the public, but to
AOYAMA BUS. L. REV. 37, 43 (2012), available at http://www.als.ao-
yama.ac.jp/pdf/AoyamaBusinessLawReview2-1.pdf.
112. Osaka Chihż Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Feb. 27, 2003, Hei 13 (wa) no.
10308, Hei 14 (wa) no. 2833, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŻHŻ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
113. Id. at 4²5.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 4²5.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id.
118. Id.; Kaoru Suzuki, et. al, Fukyżhż 2 Jż 1 Kż 1²9 Gż no Saibanrei ni Miru
Shżko Syƈsyƈ & Kakuhono Jitsumu [Practice of Evidence Collection and
Preservation Seen in Court Decisions under UCPA art. 2., para. 1, 1²9], JAPAN
PAT. ATT’YS ASSOC. (JPAA) J.: PAT. 63, 74 (2016), https://system.jpaa.or.jp/pa-
tents_files_old/201611/jpaapatent201611_063-076.pdf.
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those persons who could benefit economically from the trade se-
cret.
119
For example, a specialized production technique that was
unknown to the general public, but known widely within its re-
lated industry, would not qualify for trade secret protection.
120
Similarly, information that is available in publications would
not qualify for trade secret protection.
121
Although information
that can be easily copied from a product would not be eligible for
trade secret protection, information that is revealed through a
“lengthy and expensive” reverse engineering process could qual-
ify as a protectable trade secret.
122
2. TRIPS Subject Matter Requirement 2: The Information “has
commercial value because it is secret”
123
With regard to the “commercial value” requirement, Japan’s
UCPA statutory language differs slightly from that of the TRIPS
Agreement and defines this element in terms of its “usefulness.”
Because something can be useful even without having commer-
cial value, this is an example of Japan providing broader trade
secret protection than is required under the TRIPS Agreement.
The “independent economic value” language of the
UTSA/DTSA also appears to be somewhat broader in scope than
the “commercial value” requirement of the TRIPS Agreement
since a trade secret may arguably have economic, but not com-
mercial, value. On the other hand, the UTSA/DTSA’s qualifying
language of “independent” seems to rein in the broadness of that
definition.
a. Japan: UCPA’s “Usefulness” Requirement
Regarding the UCPA requirement that qualifying information
be useful for commercial applications, Japanese courts have in-
terpreted this provision liberally and have not required detailed
proof of the economic value of the information.
124
Rather, the
119. UTSA § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); see also 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM &
ERICE. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADESECRETS § 1.01 (2017) (noting that because
the term “readily ascertainable” is not defined within the UTSA, its ordinary
meaning should be used as a guide for the trier of fact).
120. See UTSA § 1 cmt.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 39(2)(b).
124. Sato, supra note 64, at 3; see also Chris Neumeyer, Trade Secrets and
Employee Mobility in the U.S. and Asia, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 9, 2013),
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“usefulness” requirement serves to exclude those trade secrets
that are insufficiently beneficial to society, such as information
about scandals or illegal activities.
125
For example, in Kżkyż
Doboku Sekisan Laboratory Co. v. Sayƈ System, the Tokyo Dis-
trict Court held that information about acceptable prices for bid-
ding on public works projects in Saitama Prefecture was not use-
ful in commercial activity because such information impeded the
public bidding process and was contrary to the public interest.
126
As such, that pricing information did not satisfy the “usefulness”
requirement and was not protectable as a trade secret.
127
b. United States: UTSA/DTSA’s “independent economic value”
Requirement
The language of the “independent economic value” require-
ment indicates that the information must derive its value from
both being secret and from its value to third parties.
128
Infor-
mation that provides its owner a competitive advantage is also
characterized as having independent economic value.
129
Com-
ments to Section 1 of the UTSA explain that the definition of a
trade secret therein is broader than as defined in the Restate-
ment (First) of Torts, and includes information having the po-
tential to become valuable, as well as so-called “negative infor-
mation.”
130
Negative information relates to processes or materi-
als that may have been investigated, but did not lead to fruition.
For example, in the research and development stage of product
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/10/09/trade-secrets-and-employee-mobility-
in-the-u-s-and-asia/id=45666/ (explaining that despite the added “usefulness”
requirement of the UCPA, the definitions of trade secrets under the United
States’ UTSA and Japan’s UCPA are substantially similar).
125. Sato, supra note 64, at 3 (describing that information regarding illegal
activity, despite possible usefulness in a commercial sense, could not be pro-
tected as trade secrets; examples of such exclusions include tax evasion meth-
ods or methods to circumvent environmental protection laws).
126. Tżkyż Chihż Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 14, 2002, Hei 12 (wa) no.
9499, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŻHŻ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, 4²5,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
127. Id.
128. ROWE & SANDEEN, TRADE SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 51, at 42²43.
129. MILGRIM, supra note 119.
130. The UTSA “depart[s] from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition
which required that a trade secret be ¶continuously used in one’s business.’”
UTSA § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
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development, great time and expense may be expended only to
prove that a certain process does not achieve its intended result,
but this information about what does not work may provide a
competitive advantage to its owner.
131
3. TRIPS Subject Matter Requirement 3: The Information “has
been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances . . . to
keep it secret”
132
Both Japanese and the U.S. trade secret provisions comply
with the TRIPS Agreement requirement for “reasonable steps
under the circumstances” to maintain secrecy. The statutory
language in Japan’s UCPA provision does not imply that only
“reasonable” secrecy measures are needed, but Japanese courts
will consider the circumstances when determining the particular
level of required secrecy. On the other hand, the corresponding
provisions in the UTSA and DTSA both closely mirror the lan-
guage of the TRIPS Agreement.
a. Japan: UCPA’s “kept as a secret” Requirement
In determining whether a trade secret is “kept secret,” Japa-
nese courts generally weigh two factors: the extent to which ac-
cess of the information is restricted and whether an individual
unauthorized to use the information is able to recognize that it
is secret.
133
Moreover, the information must be maintained in a
manner that objectively provides notice to employees or third
parties that the information is secret. Also, the extent to which
secrecy measures are implemented can vary according to such
131. Negative information may be the result of “lengthy and expensive re-
search which proves that a certain process will not work . . . [and] could be of
great value to a competitor.” Id.
132. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 54, art. 39(2)(c).
133. Sato, supra note 64, at 3; Trade Secret Management Guidelines, supra
note 109, at 5 n.5 (2015) (These two factors³restriction of access and indica-
tion as a secret³while important, are not independent. Restricting access is
considered to be one way of ensuring that the information will be recognizable
as secret information. As long as the person accessing information is able to
recognize that the information is secret, the “kept in secret” prong cannot be
denied based on insufficient access control. That is not to say, however, that a
company would not need to implement secrecy measures if their employees
were able to actually recognize certain information as secret information. Ar-
ticle 2(6) of the UCPA is thought to require the implementation of some sort of
secrecy control measures.).
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factors as the size of the company, the type of work, the employ-
ees’ jobs, and the nature of the information.
134
The “kept secret”
prong is frequently challenged, and Japanese courts decide this
issue on a case-by-case basis, weighing all relevant facts.
135
One interesting case that turned on the “kept secret” prong of
Japan’s UCPA involved a men’s toupee business that main-
tained a customer list on the interior side of a store counter.
136
The customer list was positioned in such a manner that employ-
ees could see the list but others could not and was marked as
“highly confidential.”
137
The defendant, a former employee of the
business, had subsequently opened his own shop selling and
manufacturing toupees, and had been contacting customers on
the list and attempting to enter into agreements with them.
138
The Osaka District Court recognized that customer lists in the
men’s toupee industry are difficult to acquire and that the plain-
tiff had continued to spend large sums on advertising over many
years to acquire its customer list.
139
The court held that under
the particular circumstances of this case, because the list was
marked as “highly confidential” and maintained on the interior
side of the store counter such that customers could not see it, the
customer list was “kept as a secret” and thus did qualify as a
trade secret.
140
b. United States: UTSA “efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances” and the DTSA’s “reasonable measures” to Main-
tain Secrecy Requirement
UTSA Section 1 comments list examples of secrecy efforts that
U.S. courts have found to be reasonable, including “advising em-
ployees of the existence of a trade secret,” “limiting access to a
trade secret on a ¶need to know basis,’” and “controlling plant
access.”
141
Similar to the Japanese court’s consideration of the
facts and circumstances in the aforementioned toupee case, the
134. Trade Secret Management Guidelines, supra note 109, at 3²5.
135. Sato, supra note 64, at 2.
136. Osaka Chihż Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Apr. 16, 1996, Hei 6 (wa) no.
4404, SAIBANSHOSAIBANREI JŻHŻ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, 4, http://www.courts.go.jp
(Japan).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 4, 6.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id.
141. UTSA § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
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UTSA comments further explain that the “reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy” requirement only mandates that efforts be
“reasonable under the circumstances.”
142
The statute does not
require “extreme and unduly expensive procedures” to protect
against industrial espionage, and the Section 1 comments cite E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher as an illustrative
example.
143
In this case, the court found that the hiring of pho-
tographers to take aerial photographs of new construction at a
competitor’s plant was an improper means of obtaining a trade
secret and that the plaintiff was not expected to have protected
against such an extreme form of industrial espionage.
144
B. Comparison of Prohibited Acts of Trade Secret Misappropri-
ation
Referring back to the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement, the
relevant requirement set forth in TRIPS Article 39(2) is that
“natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of prevent-
ing information lawfully within their control from being dis-
closed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in
a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.”
145
Footnote
10 to Article 39(2) provides further clarification in the form of
specific examples of practices that are “contrary to honest com-
mercial practices.”
146
The analysis below shows that both Japa-
nese and U.S. laws comport with the TRIPS Agreement defini-
tion of misappropriation. Japan’s UCPA is notably more explicit
than the corresponding language in the UTSA/DTSA statutes,
and such detailed language is characteristic of a civil law stat-
ute, where the application of law is not expected to develop
through case law precedents.
142. Id.
143. Id.; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th
Cir. 1970).
144. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 431 F.2d at 1016 (the court stating that “[p]er-
haps ordinary fences and roofs must be built to shut out incursive eyes, but we
need not require the discoverer of a trade secret to guard against the unantic-
ipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable methods of espionage now avail-
able”).
145. TRIPS Agreement supra note 44, art. 39(2).
146. Id.
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1. Misappropriation under Japan’s UCPA
Japanese law protects trade secrets not as property, but
against infringement by unfair acts.
147
To better understand the
nuances of the UCPA, it is instructive to examine closely the
types of unfair acts that would be considered misappropriation.
Article 2, Section 1 of the UCPA of 2016 proscribes sixteen dif-
ferent types of unfair acts, seven of which expressly relate to
147. UBUKATA, supra note 59, at 6. See also Matsuo, supra note 72, at 78.
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trade secrets.
148
Japan’s METI provides a detailed, article-by-ar-
ticle explanation of the UCPA,
149
and is the primary reference
on which the following analysis of the statute language is based.
148. Article 2, section 1 of the UCPA of 2016 provides that
((iv) the act of acquiring a Trade Secret by theft, fraud, du-
ress, or other wrongful means (hereinafter referred to as the
“Act of Wrongful Acquisition”), or the act of using or disclos-
ing (including the disclosure in confidence to a specific person
or persons; the same applies hereinafter) a Trade Secret
through an Act of Wrongful Acquisition;
(v) the act of acquiring a Trade Secret with the knowledge, or
with gross negligence in not knowing, that there has been an
intervening Act of Wrongful Acquisition, or the act of using
or disclosing a Trade Secret so acquired;
(vi) the act of using or disclosing an acquired Trade Secret
after having learned, or with gross negligence in not having
learned, subsequent to its acquisition, that there had been an
intervening Act of Wrongful Acquisition;
(vii) the act of using or disclosing a Trade Secret that has
been disclosed by the business operator that owns said Trade
Secret (hereinafter referred to as the “Owner”) for the pur-
pose of acquiring a wrongful gain, or causing damage to said
Owner;
(viii) the act of acquiring a Trade Secret with the knowledge,
or with gross negligence in not knowing, that said Trade Se-
cret’s disclosure is an Act of Improper Disclosure (meaning,
in the case prescribed in the preceding item, the act of dis-
closing a Trade Secret for the purpose prescribed in said item,
or the act of disclosing a Trade Secret in breach of a legal duty
to maintain secrecy; the same applies hereinafter) or that
there has been an intervening Act of Improper Disclosure
with regard to said Trade Secret, or the act of using or dis-
closing a Trade Secret so acquired;
(ix) the act of using or disclosing an acquired Trade Secret
after having learned, or with gross negligence in not having
learned, subsequent to its acquisition, that said Trade Se-
cret’s disclosure was an Act of Improper Disclosure or that
there had been an intervening Act of Improper Disclosure
with regard to said Trade Secret;
(x) the act of assigning, delivering, displaying for the purpose
of assignment or delivery, exporting, importing, or providing
2019] Trade Secret Protection in Japan and the US 743
METI explains that in UCPA Article 2(1)(iv), the “act of ac-
quiring by theft, fraud, duress or other wrongful means,” or of
“using or disclosing” a trade secret acquired through wrongful
means, are acts of blatant illegality and thus are considered “un-
fair competition.”
150
The term “other wrongful means” applies
not only to overtly criminal acts, such as theft and fraud that fall
under penal statutes, but is also understood to apply to the use
of means that contravenes public policy and social norms.
151
The
act of “acquiring” includes acts in which a defendant or a third
party physically obtains a trade secret via recording media or
the like, as well as acts such as memorizing a trade secret, where
a defendant or a third party obtains the trade secret without any
transfer of the medium on which the trade secret has been rec-
orded.
152
The act of “using” a trade secret includes such acts as
the direct use of trade secrets containing technical information
about another company’s product or manufacturing method, or
the act of referencing another company’s market research data
through a telecommunications line Things created by the acts
listed in item (iv) to the preceding item (limited to an act of
using a Technical Secret (meaning a Trade Secret which is
technical information; the same applies hereinafter); herein-
after referred to as an “Act of Unauthorized Use” in this item)
(excluding an act of assigning, delivering, displaying for the
purpose of assignment or delivery, exporting, importing, or
providing through a telecommunications line said Things by
a person who has received said Things by assignment (lim-
ited to a person who, at the time of receiving said Things by
assignment, had no knowledge that the Things were created
by an Act of Unauthorized Use, and such lack of knowledge
was not based on gross negligence)).
UCPA, supra note 19, art. 2(1)(iv)²(x).
149. Chikujż Kaisetsu Fusei Kyżsż Bżshi Hż, Heisei 27 Kaiseiban [FY2015
Revised Article-by-Article Explanations of the UCPA], MINISTRY ECON., TRADE
& INDUS. (Jan. 2017), http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/chizai/chiteki/un-
fair-competition.html#chikujo [hereinafter FY2015 Revised Article-by-Article
Explanations of the UCPA]; see also METI Compiled the FY2015 Revised Arti-
cle-by-Article Explanations of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, MINISTRY
ECON., TRADE & INDUS., http://www.meti.go.jp/eng-
lish/press/2016/0513_02.html (last visited May 22, 2019).
150. FY2015 Revised Article-by-Article Explanations of the UCPA, supra note
149, at 77.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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that is a trade secret.
153
The act of “disclosing” a trade secret
means informing a third party of a trade secret, and also in-
cludes the act of informing a specific person without losing the
“not publicly known” nature of the trade secret,
154
as well as the
act of transferring possession of a tangible object that embodies
a trade secret.
155
As an example of the evolving strictness of Japanese trade se-
cret law, Japanese attorneys Sato andWatanabe cite the August
2014 conviction under the UCPA of a defendant who had stolen
his former employer’s trade secrets, but had not actually dissem-
inated them.
156
This case is noteworthy in that it marks the first
time a former employee was prosecuted in Japan for having ille-
gally acquired, but not yet used or disclosed, a trade secret.
157
UCPA Article 2(1)(v) applies to the situation in which a third
party acquires or uses a trade secret that the third party knows,
or is grossly negligent in not knowing, to have been misappro-
priated by an intervening party.
158
The “knowledge” that the
trade secret has been acquired with an intervening wrongful ac-
quisition is considered to be “bad faith,” and “gross negligence in
not knowing” is considered an extreme breach of the duty of care
and is treated similarly to bad faith.
159
This express mention of
“gross negligence” is thought to comport with the definition of “a
manner contrary to honest commercial practices” in TRIPS Ar-
ticle 39(2) footnote 10.
160
UCPA Article 2(1)(vi) describes acts where a third party ac-
quires a trade secret in good faith or without gross negligence,
but then later learns (such as from extensive reporting of an in-
dustrial spy incident), or is grossly negligent in not learning,
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. See also Tżkyż Chihż Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 28, 2010, Hei
18 (wa) no. 29160, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŻHŻ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, 3, 47²48,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan) (holding that coenzyme Q10-producing bacte-
ria was itself a trade secret).
156. Sato & Watanabe, supra note 10.
157. Id.
158. FY2015 Revised Article-by-Article Explanations of the UCPA, supra note
149, at 78.
159. Id. at 79.
160. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 39(2), n.10; UBUKATA, supra note
59, at 8.
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that there had been an intervening act of wrongful acquisition,
and subsequently uses or discloses the trade secret.
161
UCPA Article 2(1)(vii) describes the act of using or disclosing
a trade secret, which the trade secret owner has disclosed to a
person such as an employee, subcontractor, or licensee, for the
purpose of acquiring a wrongful gain or of causing damage to the
owner.
162
The trade secret “owner” is defined as the “business
owner that owns the trade secret,
163
and therefore, licensees can
also be considered “owners.” The term, “disclosed by the business
operator that owns said trade secret,” means that the trade se-
cret was not acquired in a wrongful manner.
164
This could per-
tain, for example, to situations in which the owner disclosed the
trade secret orally or by handing it over, or provided the right to
access the trade secret, or in situations when the trade secret is
used in one’s work duties.
165
“For the purpose of acquiring a
wrongful gain” refers not only to the purpose of running a com-
peting business, but also broadly to the purpose of achieving a
wrongful gain in a manner that contravenes public policy and is
a breach of fair and equitable principles.
166
Moreover, “the pur-
pose of acquiring a wrongful gain” is not limited to the trade se-
cret-acquiring party, and may also apply to the purpose of caus-
ing a third party to gain wrongfully.
167
The purpose of “causing
damage to said owner” refers to the damage of assets, loss of
trust, and other tangible or intangible wrongful losses, but it is
not necessary for the damage to have materialized.
168
The case of Emotion Corp. v. T.H. Co, Ltd. provides a clear ex-
ample of how a trade secret could be used for the purpose of ac-
quiring a wrongful gain.
169
In this case, the CEO of a mail order
company that sold samue, a type of traditional Japanese cloth-
ing, asked the employee in charge of the company’s computer
system to copy customer information onto a floppy disk, which
161. FY2015 Revised Article-by-Article Explanations of the UCPA, supra note
149, at 79.
162. Id. at 80.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 81.
168. Id.
169. Tżkyż Chihż Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 14, 2004, Hei 15 (wa) no.
5711, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŻHŻ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp
(Japan).
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the CEO then brought home.
170
After retiring from the company,
the ex-CEO used that customer information to conduct sales ac-
tivities at a new company.
171
Finding the ex-CEO to be using
that information for the purpose of acquiring a wrongful gain,
the Tokyo District Court issued an injunction to prohibit his new
company from entering into any contracts with the customers
listed in that floppy disk file and also ordered the destruction of
the floppy disk itself.
172
UCPA Article 2(1)(viii) describes the act of acquiring a trade
secret with the knowledge, or gross negligence in not knowing,
that the trade secret was disclosed improperly, or the act of us-
ing or disclosing a trade secret so acquired.
173
An improper dis-
closure is either the disclosure of a trade secret obtained from its
owner for the purpose of wrongful gain or of inflicting harm upon
the owner as set forth in Article 2(1)(vii), or the disclosure of a
trade secret in breach of a legal duty to maintain secrecy.
174
An illustrative case is Nihon Jinzai Sabisu v. Hand Hands in
which two employees of a staffing agency improperly disclosed a
staffing name list owned by the agency to a third party, and the
third-party proceeded to use the name list to solicit business.
175
In this case, the Tokyo District Court found the staffing name
list to be a trade secret, ruled that the two defendants were in
violation of UCPA Article 2(vii) for their use and disclosure of
the information to the third-party company, and that the third-
party company was in violation of UCPA Article 2(viii) for its
acquisition and use of the information despite having known
that the information had been disclosed improperly by the two
defendants.
176
UCPA Article 2(1)(ix) describes acts where a third party uses
or discloses an acquired trade secret after learning, such as by
being warned by the trade secret owner, or failing to learn due
170. Id. at 7.
171. Id. at 8.
172. Id.
173. FY2015 Revised Article-by-Article Explanations of the UCPA, supra note
149, at 82.
174. Id.
175. Tżkyż Chihż Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Dec. 26, 2002, Hei 12 (wa) no.
22457, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŻHŻ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, 14
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
176. Id. at 13²15.
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to gross negligence, that the trade secret was wrongfully dis-
closed or that there had been a wrongful intervening disclo-
sure.
177
The UCPA contains a specific carve-out, however, for in-
stances of trade secret use or disclosure by a third-party that, at
the time of acquiring the trade secret, did not know, or was not
grossly negligent in not knowing, that the disclosure was im-
proper or that there had been an intervening act of wrongful ac-
quisition.
178
UCPA Article 2(1)(x) describes the acts of “assigning, deliver-
ing, displaying for the purpose of assigning or delivering, export-
ing, importing, or providing through a telecommunications line”
things created by unauthorized use of the trade secret.
179
Unau-
thorized use is considered to be any of the acts listed in Article
2(1)(iv) to (ix), and is limited to acts that use technical trade se-
crets.
180
The recipient of the thing is exempt from this provision
as long as he or she exhibited good faith and no gross negligence
at the time of the assignment.
181
Because a trade secret-infring-
ing product can be distributed widely, this provision was newly
added to the UCPA of 2016 to strengthen deterrence of trade se-
cret infringement by restricting the transfer of trade secret-in-
fringing products.
182
2. Misappropriation under the United States’ UTSA/DTSA
The DTSA closely mirrors the UTSA’s language for a defining
“misappropriation.” As in the case of Japan’s UCPA, neither the
UTSA nor the DTSA requires actual use. Improper acquisition
is sufficient to find misappropriation.
Under the UTSA/DTSA, trade secret misappropriation is the
(i) acquisition of a trade secret by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the acquisition was by “improper means,”
or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret without consent by a
177. FY2015 Revised Article-by-Article Explanations of the UCPA, supra note
149, at 83.
178. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 19(1)(vi).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 84; METI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY OFFICE, 2017 UNFAIR
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT 1, 23 (2017), available at
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/chizai/chiteki/pdf/2017unfaircompeti-
tiontextbook.pdf.
182. FY2015 Revised Article-by-Article Explanations of the UCPA, supra note
149, at 84.
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person who (A) acquired the trade secret through “improper
means” or, (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew that the
trade secret had been acquired improperly, or (C) prior to a ma-
terial change in his/her position knew or had reason to know that
it was a trade secret acquired through accident or mistake.
183
“Improper means” is defined to include “theft, bribery, misrep-
resentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to main-
tain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other
means[.]”
184
Comments to Section 1 of the UTSA explain that
“proper means” includes: “discovery by independent invention,”
“discovery by reverse engineering,” “discovery under a license
from the owner of the trade secret,” “observation of the item in
public use or on public display,” and “obtaining the trade secret
183. Section 1(2) of the UTSA defines the act of trade secret misappropriation
as follows.
“Misappropriation” means:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was ac-
quired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without ex-
press or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the
time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
his knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized im-
proper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use;
or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or
had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
UTSA § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).
184. UTSA § 1(1).
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from published literature.”
185
The previously cited aerial recon-
naissance in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher³
where a competitor of DuPont hired photographers to take aerial
photographs of DuPont’s new chemical production facility that
was under construction³is considered an example of the use of
improper means to acquire a trade secret.
186
C. Comparison of Remedies and Damage Awards for Trade Se-
cret Misappropriation in Japan (UCPA) and the United States
(UTSA/DTSA)
Japan’s UCPA
187
and the United States’ UTSA/DTSA
188
both
provide for equitable remedies, i.e., injunctions, and damages for
trade secret misappropriation. Both also include provisions for
maintaining secrecy during the litigation process; however, the
Japanese constitutional guarantee of open trials
189
presents a
procedural obstacle for confidentiality in Japanese trade secret
litigation. Japan asserts that despite this constitutional issue, it
is in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement requirement of Ar-
ticle 42 for protecting confidential information, unless contrary
185. UTSA § 1 cmt. Similarly, the DTSA clarifies that “improper means . . .
does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other law-
ful means of acquisition.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B).
186. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th
Cir. 1970) (concluding that “aerial photography, from whatever altitude, is an
improper method of discovering the trade secrets exposed during construction
of the DuPont plant”).
187. UCPA Remedies and Damages: UCPA art. 3 injunctions (against actual
or “likely” infringement), art. 4 damages (damages resulting from the infringe-
ment, i.e. actual loss), art. 14 restoration of business reputation, and art. 21
criminal penalties and fines. UCPA, supra note 19, arts 3, 4, 14, and 21.
188. UTSA Remedies and Damages: UTSA § 2 injunctions (against actual or
threatened misappropriation), § 3 damages (allowing for recovery of actual
loss, unjust enrichment, reasonable royalties, and, in cases of willful and ma-
licious misappropriation, exemplary damages), and § 4 attorney’s fees in cases
of bad faith or willful and malicious misappropriation). UTSA §§ 2²4.
DTSA Remedies and Damages: § 1836(b)(2)(A) ex parte seizures, §
1836(b)(3)(A) injunctions against actual or threatened misappropriation, §
1836(b)(3)(B) damages for actual loss, unjust enrichment, and reasonable roy-
alties, § 1836(b)(3)(C) exemplary damages in cases of willful andmalicious mis-
appropriation, § 1836(b)(3)(D) attorney’s fees in cases of bad faith or willful and
malicious misappropriation, and § 1832 criminal penalties and fines. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1836 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012).
189. KENPŻ, supra note 27, art. 82, para. 1.
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to constitutional requirements.
190
Meanwhile, the United States
has further strengthened its measures for confidential trade se-
cret litigation with a new confidentiality provision in the DTSA
that prohibits the court from disclosing a trade secret without
first providing the trade secret owner the opportunity to file un-
der seal his or her reasons for desiring to keep the trade secret
confidential.
191
As mentioned previously, Japan’s UCPA of 2016 aims to ac-
complish the following: (1) strengthen criminal penalties; (2)
strengthen deterrents to trade secret infringement; and (3) in-
crease the effectiveness of civil remedies.
192
The UCPA has
strengthened criminal penalties through removing limitations
to the number of persons liable in a chain of successive trade
secret misappropriation.
193
The prior statute had limited liabil-
ity to the second unauthorized misappropriating party in such a
chain.
194
Another change is the criminalization of attempted un-
authorized use or disclosure of a trade secret.
195
The prior stat-
ute had only criminalized completed acts of misappropriation.
196
Additionally, the new UCPA expands the scope of criminal lia-
bility for extraterritorial acts. In consideration of the trend to-
ward cloud computing, where electronic data may be stored in
190. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 42 (Fair and Equitable Proce-
dures). See also KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES FOR THE
UNITED STATESAND JAPAN: DISPUTESANDCOMMON INTERESTS 8 (2000), availa-
ble at http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Confer-
ences/CGP/Oct2000Papers/Maskus-2.pdf.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1835(b) (2012) (Orders to Preserve Confidentiality: Rights of
Trade Secret Owners).
192. Imari, supra note 75.
193. This provision was added in response to a massive data-breach incident
in Japan in which a contract employee of Benesse, a major children’s educa-
tional company, misappropriated customer information of approximately
twenty-nine million children and their families. The information was sold and
resold successively. See Kyodo, Benesse Data Thief Gets 3½ Years in Prison, ¥3
Million Fine, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.japan-
times.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/crime-legal/benesse-data-thief-gets-
3%C2%BD-years-prison-¥3-million-fine/.
194. METI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY OFFICE, TRADE SECRET
PROTECTION IN JAPAN: RECENTAMENDMENT OFUCPA 6 (Dec. 5, 2015), available
at http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11092484/www.jpo.go.jp/tor-
ikumi/ibento/ibento2/jck_symposium/files/1205_02.pdf [hereinafter TRADE
SECRET PROTECTION IN JAPAN: RECENTAMENDMENT OFUCPA].
195. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 21(4).
196. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN JAPAN: RECENT AMENDMENT OFUCPA, su-
pra note 194.
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data centers overseas, the new UCPA explicitly criminalizes the
unauthorized acquisition of trade secrets outside of Japan in
cases where the owner of the trade secret conducts business
within Japan.
197
The prior statute had only punished the wrong-
ful use and disclosure of trade secrets outside of Japan.
198
Stronger deterrents include higher maximum fines against in-
dividuals and companies, and also a provision to confiscate im-
properly obtained profits.
199
These measures were added to
make damages large enough to discourage companies from so-
called economic infringement in situations where the resulting
profit would be significantly larger than the corresponding
fine.
200
More effective civil remedies include a reduction of the burden
of proof for plaintiffs, and an extension of the statute of limita-
tions. As a civil law country, Japan lacks a pre-trial discovery
process, and this poses a dilemma for trade secret cases. Often,
the evidence needed to prove a plaintiff’s case of trade secret
misappropriation is in the possession of the defendant. In recog-
nition of this problem, the new UCPA adopts a rebuttable pre-
sumption of misappropriation in cases involving manufacturing
methods alleged to utilize misappropriated technical trade se-
crets.
201
Although this burden-shifting provision, which requires
an alleged infringer to demonstrate an absence of trade secret
misappropriation, is limited to manufacturing methods that use
197. UCPA, supra note 19, arts. 21(6)²(7).
198. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN JAPAN: RECENT AMENDMENT OFUCPA, su-
pra note 194.
199. UCPA, supra note 19, arts. 21(1), 22(1)(ii) (raising the maximum fine
against an individual from the prior 10 million yen to 20 million yen, while
leaving unchanged the maximum prison sentence of ten years, and also in-
creasing the maximum fine against a company from 300 million yen to 500
million yen); Id. art. 21(10).
200. See Toshirż Kaba, Eigyż Himitsu Rżei Genbatsuka, Tyƈkan nado e no
Gijutsu Ryƈshyutsu ha Samategeru? [Stronger Penalties for Trade Secret Mis-
appropriation, Can This Stop the Outflow of Technology to China and South
Korea?], YOMIURI ONLINE (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.shiroyama-
tower.com/books/yomiuri/20160427.html (stating that Japan’s UCPA of 2016
not only increased the amount of fines against infringing persons and compa-
nies, but also added a provision for seizing profits obtained from acts of trade
secret misappropriation out of concern that in recent cases it had been profit-
able for the infringing party to pay the penalty if they could keep the profits).
201. “Presumption of Act of Using Technical Secret by Person Who Acquired
said Technical Secret.” UCPA, supra note 19, art. 5(2).
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technical trade secrets,
202
it is an important first step in address-
ing a systemic limitation that has often been criticized by the
United States.
203
Another change in the new UCPA is an in-
crease in the statute of limitations from ten to twenty years from
the start of misappropriation; however, as in the United States,
the right to request an injunction must be exercised within three
years from the time when knowledge of the misappropriation is
learned.
204
Japan’s UCPA also includes a unique provision for restoring
the reputation of a business harmed by trade secret misappro-
priation.
205
This provision may be carried out in the form of an
apology to the harmed party,
206
and is an example of how the
societal importance of reputation can be reflected in trade secret
law.
Meanwhile, as an amendment to the EEA, the United States’
DTSA notably adds a private civil action of ex parte seizure to
existing trade secret law, allowing the court discretion to issue,
upon ex parte application, but only in extraordinary circum-
stances, an order “providing for the seizure of property necessary
202. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN JAPAN: RECENT AMENDMENT OFUCPA, su-
pra note 194, at 8. Previously, proving trade secret misappropriation required
that the plaintiff prove: (1) wrongful acquisition and (2) wrongful use by the
defendant, and (3) actual damage to the plaintiff. Article 5(2) of the new UCPA
suspends the requirement of proving wrongful use, and shifts the burden to
the defendant to produce counterevidence. Id.
203. See, e.g., York M. Faulkner et. al, Japan’s Trade Secret Law Reform
Should Focus on Discovery, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://www.law360.com/articles/589482/japan-s-trade-secret-law-reform-
should-focus-on-discovery.
204. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 15.
205. Japan’s UCPA provides the following remedy for reputational damage
due to trade secret misappropriation or other forms of unfair competition:
Upon the request of a person whose business reputation has
been injured, the court may order the person who has inten-
tionally or negligently engaged in Unfair Competition and
thereby injured the business reputation of that person to take
the necessary measures for restoring the business reputation
of that person, in lieu of or in addition to compensation of
damages.
UCPA, supra note 19, art. 14.
206. Junichi Eguchi, The Publication of Apology (“Shazai-Kokoku”) as a Rem-
edy For Unfair Competition in Japan, 18 OSAKAU. L. REV. 19 (1971), available
at http://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/dspace/handle/11094/10834.
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to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret
that is the subject of the action.”
207
This provision was quite con-
troversial at the time it was first proposed, and there were fears
that it could be abused or used improperly to threaten competi-
tors.
208
Nevertheless, in the first year since enactment of the
DTSA, the record shows that courts have been quite restrained
in processing requests for ex parte seizure.
209
The DTSA also includes language that expressly limits court
ordered injunctions so as not to interfere with an employee’s
right to earn a living.
210
Additionally, the DTSA contains a pro-
vision for whistleblower immunity, allowing for the confidential
disclosure of a trade secret to a government official or attorney
for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected viola-
tion of law, and further stipulates that this immunity preempts
state trade secret law, i.e., the UTSA.
211
The DTSA also leaves
intact an EEA provision that applies to conduct outside the
United States.
212
Specifically, this provision applies to conduct
occurring outside the United States in cases where the offender
is a U.S. citizen or company, or if “an act in furtherance of the
offense was committed in the United States.”
213
Thus, both Ja-
pan and the United States have enlarged the scope of their trade
secret protection to include exterritorial conduct.
1. Injunctions
Because criminal sanctions often are unable to compensate a
party harmed by trade secret infringement and damages fail to
compensate for “unquantifiable advantages lost in a case of mis-
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
208. See, e.g., Eric Goldman et. al, Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the De-
fend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R. 3326) 1, 3²4 (Nov. 17, 2015),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699760.
209. Jay D. Hermele & Abigail Brown, Ex Parte Seizures Under DTSA: A 1-
Year Update, LAW360 (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.law360.com/arti-
cles/912444/ex-parte-seizures-under-dtsa-a-1-year-update (reporting that in
the year since the DTSA was enacted, the “extraordinary circumstances” limi-
tation has restrained courts from routinely granting requests for ex parte sei-
zure).
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2012). See infra note 226.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012).
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012).
213. Id.
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appropriation,” injunctions have been cited as the preferred rem-
edy for trade secret misappropriation.
214
Both Japan’s UCPA
and the United States’ UTSA/DTSA provide for injunctive relief,
yet each country’s implementation of injunctive relief differs sig-
nificantly. When responding to an allegation of trade secret mis-
appropriation, time is often of the essence, and immediate action
is needed to stop the alleged harm. The process of applying for
injunctive relief in Japan is often too slow to allow for a swift
response. Indeed, Japan’s lack of speed in responding to trade
secret infringement allegations has been criticized as being “in-
compatible with the dynamics of trade secret protection.”
215
Pre-
liminary injunctions, and especially an ex parte temporary re-
straining order, can be effective when relief is needed to stop
harm quickly. Japan’s legal system does allow for preliminary
injunctions, but unlike the United States, it does not have a
mechanism for ex parte preliminary injunctions. Meanwhile, as
aforementioned, the United States’ DTSA takes the extra step of
establishing a provision for the ex parte seizure of property nec-
essary to prevent the dissemination of the trade secret.
216
2. Damages
Japanese and U.S. trade secret laws both allow for the recov-
ery of damages. Under Japan’s UCPA, relief is limited to the ac-
tual damages.
217
There is no possibility of exemplary damages or
attorney’s fees. The United States, however, allows for not only
actual damages, but also punitive damages and attorney’s
fees.
218
These additional damages may be imposed under certain
circumstances, and are intended to discourage economic in-
fringement, which may otherwise arise if the penalties are suf-
ficiently less than the potential gain.
214. Dratler, supra note 23, at 67, 89, 99, and 110.
215. See, e.g., Mark Schultz, Remarks at the Developments in Trade Secret
Protection Public Symposium (May 8, 2017), in Developments in Trade Secret
Protection, Part I, Topic 3: Differences in Trade Secret Protection in Foreign
Jurisdictions, at 3:10:11, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 8, 2017),
https://rev-vbrick.uspto.gov/#/videos/a712d07b-8c14-418f-be6c-536d6580b876.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i).
217. See UCPA, supra note 19, art. 4.
218. See UTSA §§ 3²4, 14 U.L.A. 633²42 (2005); 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B)
(allowing for recovery of not only actual loss, but under certain circumstances,
also exemplary damages and attorney’s fees).
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the statutory provisions embodied in existing
trade secret law, several policy concerns deserve attention. The
digital era is fundamentally changing ways in which trade is
conducted. The rise of the Internet, cloud computing, and glob-
alization increase trade opportunities, while at the same time,
aggravate the risks of trade secret misappropriation.
219
On the
other hand, there is also a concern that trade secret law can
overreach and impinge on the basic rights of citizens, especially
the right to earn a living. A balance must be found between the
need for trade secret protection and workers’ right to earn a liv-
ing.
A. Need for Multilateral Agreements to Protect Trade Secrets
Globally
As national economies become increasingly interconnected
and interdependent upon one another and the importance of in-
ternational trade rises, the imperative to protect one’s trade se-
crets on a global scale also intensifies. A prominent example is
the Trade Secrets Directive recently passed by the EU, which
aims to strengthen and harmonize trade secret protection
throughout Europe.
220
In contrast, the United States has re-
cently withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
treaty that had aimed to facilitate trade among trans-Pacific
trading partner nations through, in part, mandating strict trade
secret protection.
221
Despite the abrupt withdrawal by the
219. Kim et al., supra note 13, at 5.
220. The EU Trade Secrets Directive, which required compliance by EU
member countries by June 9, 2018, aims to harmonize and set minimum stand-
ards for the protection of trade secrets among EU member countries. See EU
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 34.
221. The trade secret provisions of the TPP would have required member na-
tions to prevent the misappropriation of trade secrets by both private and
state-owned entities. Moreover, although certain exceptions would be permit-
ted, the TPP also would have required member nations to establish criminal
procedures and penalties for trade secret and cyber-theft. Specifically, the TPP
would have surpassed even current U.S. trade secret protection under the
DTSA by criminalizing not only misappropriation and disclosure, but also ac-
cess by requiring each party to “provide for criminal procedures and penalties
for . . . the unauthorized and willful access to a trade secret held in a computer
system” TPP art. 18.78, para. 2(a), whereas DTSA §§ 1831, 1832 criminalize
misappropriation (taking) and unauthorized disclosure but not authorized ac-
cess. See Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP] art. 18.78, para. 2(a), Oct. 5, 2015,
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United States, the language of the TPP’s trade secret provisions
attests that the United States does, in fact, seek more robust
trade secret protection, especially against trade secret misappro-
priation by foreign state-owned entities. Unfortunately, now the
United States will not be a direct beneficiary of those strong
trade secret protection provisions it had fought to be included in
the TPP.
Meanwhile, absent U.S. leadership, the remaining TPP mem-
ber countries forged ahead to reach an agreement known as the
TPP-11, or more formally, as the Comprehensive and Progres-
sive Trans-Pacific Partnership.
222
Talks are also underway for
an even more expansive multilateral trade agreement called the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,
223
which in-
cludes Japan, China, and India, but not the United States, and
that would also likely contain provisions for trade secret protec-
tion. Japan’s leadership in the negotiations of both these treaties
demonstrates their strong interest in robust trade secret protec-
tion. Current U.S. policy may be out of step with its business
community, however, as major U.S. industry trade groups have
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-part-
nership/tpp-full-text; 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §1832 (2012); FACT
SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership’s High-Standard Rules Promote U.S. Inter-
ests and Values, OFF. U.S. TRADE REP. (May 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2016/may/fact-sheet-trans-pacific-
partnership’s. Another objective of the TPP was to forge stronger ties among
the signatory nations to counter the increasing dependence on trade with
China. See, e.g., Jane Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a
Check on China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-aus-
tralia.html.
222. The Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP), which came into force on December 30, 2018, retains the majority of
the original TPP provisions, including criminal penalties for the unauthorized,
willful access of trade secrets (see supra note 221 and accompanying text), but
did suspend some other IP-related provisions. See, e.g., Asian Trade Centre,
CPTPP: Unpacking the Suspended Provisions, Policy Brief No. 17-11a (March
2018), available at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5393d501e4b0643446abd228/t/5aa0eb3
c9140b75cb2070691/1520495424652/Policy+Brief+17-
11a+TPP11+Suspensions+%28with+amendments%29.pdf.
223. Eric Johnson, Japan Breathes New Life into Regional, Non-U.S. Trade
Pact, Asian 16-Nation Deal Draws Tokyo’s Attention in Wake of TPP’s Demise,
JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.japan-
times.co.jp/news/2017/01/30/reference/japan-breathes-new-life-regional-non-
u-s-trade-pact/#.Wd5ASkzMyu4.
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recently advised the United States Trade Representative “to
make global trade secrets protection a priority in trade negotia-
tions and bilateral trade dialogues.”
224
Whether the United
States will heed the advice of its own industry trade groups re-
mains to be seen.
B. Need for a Balanced Approach
On the other hand, there are countervailing concerns that
trade secret law is becoming too strict and inhibitory of the
rights and liberties of citizens, especially in regard to employee
mobility and the ability to accept a new job.
225
To allay concerns
about possible restraints on employee mobility, the DTSA in-
cludes language to proscribe injunctions that would “prevent a
person from entering into an employment relationship,” and it
requires that any conditions placed on employment be “based on
evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the
information the person knows.”
226
The rising prevalence of non-
disclosure agreements and covenants not to compete are mani-
festations of employers’ attempts to prevent the unauthorized
disclosure and use of their trade secrets when an employee
leaves to work elsewhere. Mindful that there must be a balance
between workers’ rights to earn a living and the need to protect
trade secrets, the courts generally permit such agreements only
when the restrictions are reasonable, the territorial scope and
time duration of the restrictions are limited, and the employee’s
ability to pursue a career is not unnecessarily restricted.
227
224. Letter from U.S. Industry Trade Groups to Robert Lighthizer, U.S.
Trade Representative (Nov. 7, 2017), available at http://www.ipo.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/11/2017-11-7-international-trade-secrets-association-letter-
final.pdf (writing that positive trade secret developments and efforts by the
EU, Japan, Taiwan, and other Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation partners
“suggest the timing is right for a focused government-to-government initiative
on global trade secret protection”).
225. See, e.g., James Bessen, How Companies Kill Their Employees’ Job
Searches, ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ar-
chive/2014/10/how-companies-kill-their-employees-job-searches/381437/.
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (implicitly rebutting a presumption of
“inevitable disclosure,” the so-called doctrine under which a new employee’s
disclosure of their former employer’s trade secrets is considered to be inevita-
ble).
227. See, e.g., MILGRAM, supra note 119, § 4.02; see also Kaba, supra note 200.
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Especially in Japan, where the constitution guarantees citi-
zens the freedom to choose their occupation,
228
post-employment
non-compete agreements may be deemed invalid unless care-
fully limited.
229
Japan’s UCPA does not mention employee mo-
bility, however, and only mentions employment in the context of
describing the criminal penalty for the post-employment use or
disclosure of a trade secret by a former employee who, while em-
ployed, breached his or her duty to manage the trade secret con-
fidentially.
230
Perhaps the constitutional guarantee of the free-
dom to choose one’s occupation obviates a need to protect em-
ployee mobility expressly in the UCPA.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STRENGTHENING TRADE
SECRET PROTECTION
In light of the above, the following recommendations are pro-
posed for Japan and the United States to strengthen their trade
secret protections. First, Japan should institute a mechanism for
pre-trial discovery or some similar process whereby an aggrieved
party can access evidence, such as electronic data files or web
browsing history, which is often in the possession of the alleged
infringer and that will be necessary to prove a case of trade se-
cret misappropriation. An expensive and elaborate system of
pre-trial discovery identical to the one in the United States is
unnecessary, however, and the burden shifting provision of Ar-
ticle 5(2) of Japan’s UCPA is a step in the right direction. Alt-
hough the burden-shifting provision is currently limited to man-
ufacturing methods that use technical trade secrets, the limita-
tion on subject matter could be relaxed to expand the applicabil-
ity of the provision.
Second, Japanese trade secret law could also improve secrecy
during the litigation process. Litigation to prevent the loss of
trade secrets is futile unless secrecy during litigation can be en-
sured. The Japanese constitutional requirement of open court
228. KENPŻ, supra note 27, art. 22, para. 1.
229. Id.; Emi Uchida, Japan: A. Overview, inMAYERBROWN, AGLOBALGUIDE
TO ¶RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS’ 20 (2014), available at https://www.may-
erbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/Guide%20to%20Restrictive%20Cove-
nants/MB_rest_cov_asia.pdf (stating that a post-termination restrictive cove-
nant in Japan may be deemed invalid if it conflicts with an employee’s consti-
tutional right to choose his or her employment).
230. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 21(1)(vi).
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proceedings
231
is an impediment to maintaining confidentiality
during litigation. The UCPA of 2016, however, includes provi-
sions for protective orders
232
and in-camera review
233
in civil pro-
ceedings, as well as a special mechanism for protective orders in
a criminal proceeding.
234
Yet, it has been reported that protec-
tive orders are rarely sought due to the severe penalties associ-
ated with violating one.
235
On the other hand, a severe penalty
is not necessarily detrimental, and may ensure greater compli-
ance with the protective order. Without a constitutional amend-
ment, however, this issue may not improve. As things stand now,
Japan’s litigation process does meet the minimal requirements
of TRIPS Article 42, which only require “a means to identify and
protect confidential information, unless this would be contrary
to existing constitutional requirements.”
236
Third, the protection of trade secrets often requires swift ac-
tion to stop an infringing use or to prevent the further disclosure
of a trade secret. For this reason, Japan should adopt a mecha-
nism for ex parte injunctive relief, and should streamline the ap-
plication procedure so that temporary restraining orders can be
issued more quickly.
Finally, Japan should consider allowing awards of punitive
damage and attorney’s fees. Such fees not only deter malicious,
bad-faith conduct, but also serve to discourage economic in-
fringement. Without such penalties and fee-shifting measures in
place, a party may be incentivized to misappropriate trade se-
crets whenever the perceived gain outweighs the potential lia-
bility.
In many ways, the United States has set the global standard
for trade secret protection. Yet, in order to continue to be a leader
in this area and to protect its trade secrets overseas, the United
States should heed the advice of its industry trade groups and
make the global protection of trade secrets a priority in interna-
tional trade treaties. Given the international nature of business
in the Internet age, the United States would benefit from such a
231. KENPŻ, supra note 27, art. 82, para. 1.
232. UCPA, supra note 19, art. 10(1)
233. See id. art. 13(1).
234. Id. art. 23.
235. Id. art. 21(2)(vi); Faulkner et. al, supra note 203.
236. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 42 (Fair and Equitable Proce-
dures).
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global system, and therefore, should work with other countries
to establish the broad international protection of trade secrets.
Additionally, following the example of the “Trade Secret Man-
agement Guidelines” issued by Japan’s METI, the United States
should take on a more proactive role in providing guidance for
best practices for trade secret protection. In contrast to METI’s
dedicated web-based resource for UPCA-related information,
237
the U.S. government only provides scant information about the
DTSA, and the little that is available is scattered among various
websites, such as those belonging to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, the Department of Justice, and the Office
of the United States Trade Representative. Another example of
the Japanese government’s proactive role in protecting trade se-
crets is its recently announced plans to enact new rules limiting
foreign ownership in telecoms and technology companies.
238
Alt-
hough the United States has recently sought to impose severe
company-specific restrictions against the Chinese technology
company, Huawei,
239
Japan’s broad-based approach is some-
thing that the United States might also want to consider adopt-
ing.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis has shown that Japan and the United
States define trade secret subject matter and acts of misappro-
priation in substantially similar ways, and both conform with
the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. The implementation of
trade secret law in each country differs slightly according to so-
cietal customs and constitutional differences. Adopting addi-
tional measures to further strengthen trade secret laws, while
237. Fusei Kyżsż Bżshi Hż [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], MINISTRY
ECON., TRADE & INDUS., https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/chizai/chiteki/
(last updated Mar. 4, 2019).
238. James Cook, Japan to Limit Foreign Investment in its Technology Com-
panies as Fears Over Chinese Ownership Escalate, TELEGRAPH (May 28, 2019),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/05/28/japan-limit-foreign-invest-
ment-technology-companies-fears-chinese/.
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striking a balance between the needs of industry and the free-
doms of workers, will lead to a mutually beneficial framework in
this era of increasing globalization.
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